Implications of Netting Arrangements for Bank Risk in Foreign Exchange Transactions
tHE MAJOR FINANCIAL institutions of many nations are active participants in the market for foreign exchange. The exchanges of currencies that take place through this market facilitate international trade and the international flow of capital for investments.
The volume of transactions in the foreign exchange market-already very large-has grown rapidly in recent years. As of April 1989, the date of the last international survey, foreign exchange transactions had an average value of $640 billion per business day.
With dollar amounts in this lofty range, participants in the foreign exchange market could incur substantial losses if the other parties to their transactions~s'ere to default on the payments required to settle their side of the transactions. To reduce the costs of transactions and limit the size of these possible losses, some banks engage in bilateral netting of their foreign exchange transactions.' In bilateral netting, two banks exchange daily only the net units of currencies in the transactions between them.
Some groups of banks have also studied the possibility of multilateral arrangements for netting foreign exchange transactions, though none are in operation at this time.2 Members of a multilateral netting arrangement would settle transactions with each other by making payments to a clearing house for their net position in each currency with the other members.
As part of their responsibility to avoid disruptions in the operation of payment systems, central banks have a strong interest in such netting 1 Netting agreements between pairs of banks may apply to payments in settlement of transactions other than foreign exchange. This paper, however, limits analysis to the netting of foreign exchange transactions. All participants in the foreign exchange market are called banks to simplify exposition. In some markets, the important participants include firms that are not banks. See Federal Reserve Bank of New York (1989) and Bank of England (1989) . See glossaw on page 14 for definition of netting and other terms used in this paper. 2 See Deeg (1990) , Duncan (1991) , Luthringhausen (1990) II Netting scheme participants should have a clear understanding of the impact of the particular scheme on each of the financial risks affected by the netting process Ill Multilateral netting systems should have clearly defined procedures for the management of credit risks and liquidity risks which specify the respective responsibilities of the netting provider and th participants. These procedures should also ensure that all parties have both the incentives and the capabilities to manage and contain each of the risks they bear and that limits are placed on the maximum level of credit exposure that can be produced by each participant IV Multilateral netting systems should at a minimum be capable of ensuring the timely completion of daily settlements in the event of an inability to settle by the participant with the largest single net-debit position turnover net of double-counting a ising from both local and cross-border interbank business. 2 Based on estimates of domestic and cross-border inter
The process of confirmation and settlement bank business arranged through brokers, begins after traders at two banks agree on the 3 No adjustment for less than full coverage, estimated -market coverage is given in square brackets terms of a transaction. Each bank sends the other a message specifying the terms of the~Greece Ireland Norw y Portugal transaction, using a variety of methods, includ--SOURCE-Bank for International Settlements (1990a) ing telephone calls. If the details of the messages match, the transaction is consider-ed confirmed.
settlement. On the value date, banks transmit 'I'he next step depends on the value date of information to initiate payment. The steps to inthe transaction. If it is a forward transaction, itiate payment depend on the payment system with a value date several weeks or months into used in the country issuing the currency and the future, the information is stored for future the relationship of the paying bank to that pay-"For a more detailed discussion of the foreign exchange "Federal Reserve Bank of New York (1989). market, see Chrysfat (1984) . 'Bank of England (1989) . Suppose, for instance, that a bank headquartered in the United States must pay German marks to a counterparty to settle a foreign exchange transaction. The U.S. bank instructs its German correspondent to make payment to the counterparty (or the counterparty's German correspondent). The German correspondent debits the account of the U.S. hank denominated in marks and transfers the marks to the counterparty. Suppose a U.S. hank is obligated to pay dollars. It would send a message over CHIPS to make payment to the counterparty, either directly if it is a member of CHIPS, or through a correspondent in New York who is a member of GRIPS)°B anks assume the risk that their counterparties will default on payments on their side of foreign exchange transactions. Effects on counterparties of default on settlement obligations depend on the financial condition of the bank that defaults. A solvent hank may default for a variety of reasons. Operating problems (for cxample, computer failure) may prevent them from executing their payment instructions. A solvent counterparty may not have funds in the proper currency on the value date, or-simply may forget to send payment oi-ders to settle some of their transactions.
Defaults by solvent banks on settlement obligations may have systemic effects, preventing other banks from settling their obligations. These banks may turn to their central banks for short-term loans denominated in the curren-'SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication) is an electronic system, located in Brussels, Belgium, for sending messages among the world's major banks, "See Bank for International Settlement (1990b) cies necessary to settle their obligations. Thus, central banks have a collective interest in minimizing the chances of such liquidity problems.
Most liquidity problems am-c often only temporary. Bankruptcy and liquidation of a participant in the foreign exchange market, however, pose a more serious threat to individual counterparties and create the potential for systemic disruptions in the payment system (default by one bank causing default by others). Under a general definition of bankruptcy, the value of liabilities exceeds the value of assets. Some large bankm-upt banks have been reorganized with assistance of their home governments. 'The reorganized banks continue to operate as going concerns, making payments in settlement of their obligations. Such reorganizations impose no losses on their counterparties.
In other cases, however, bankrupt banks cease to operate as going concerns. The courts appoint receivers to liquidate the bankrupt banks' assets and make payments to their creditors. The receivers may impose losses on other banks that were counterparties to foreign exchange transactions. Such losses depend on the legal pr-inciples followed by bankm'uptcy courts and the nature of netting agreements between counterpar tiesThe effects of the liquidation of a participant in the foreign exchange market on its cOunter'-parties are illustrated below Legal assumptions are specified along the way as the example raises questions about the principles followed by bankruptcy courts. In each case in which a bank is assumed to go bankrupt, it is also assumed to be liquidated by a court-appointed receiver.
The.E~rampIe
Suppose three banks (A, B and C) engage in fom'eign exchange transactions in two currencies: the U.S. dollar and the British pound. Each bank has foreign exchange transactions with the other two. ' Table 4 lists the transactions between the counterparties to be settled on the same value date. Each pair of banks has two transactions to settle. In one transaction, a hank pays dollars in exchange for pounds; in the other, a bank pays pounds in exchange for dollars.
The exchange rate on the value date is $1.65 per British pound. Transactions to he settled on the value date were negotiated a few days earlier-when the exchange rate was higher: some transactions were negotiated with an exchange rate of $1.70; others, with an exchange rate of $1.75. Transactions are of varying size, creating imbalances in the flows of currencies between counterparties.
The example is designed to be as simple as possible and yet illustrate the risk involved in netting arrangements. 'rhere must he at least two transactions between a pair of banks if bilateral netting is to reduce the volume of payments and settlement risk. Three is the minimum number of banks for multilatemal netting. 
g .[tr'anee.!m!m
To illustrate how netting arrangenients affect risk, one must first understand the risk that banks assume without a netting agreement.
Legal ,%aeu t pLaa'ta .... This section specifies several assumptions about the legal principles that the bankruptcy court follows when banks settle their transactions without netting arrangements. While these principles are not applied in all cases, they at-c common and they simplify the analysis.
One assumption concerns the application of legal rights of set-off permitted by the court. Under' the legal rights of set-off, the counterparty of a failed bank may settle its obligations with the receiver by paying the net amount of the transactions between them. If on net the failed bank owes a solvent counterparty, the counterparty is a general creditor of the failed bank for the net amount. Applying the rights of set-off to the foreign exchange transactions between a pair of banks yields the same loss to the solvent countem'party as it would under bilateral netting. Applying the legal rights of set-off, however, is uncertain and varies among the courts of different countries." In this paper, rights of set-off are assumed not to apply in bankr'uptc~.Each transaction is treated separately, not linked to other transactions between the same par-ties.
The court with jurisdiction in a bankruptcy case is assumed to appoint a receiver. In making payments to settle foreign exchange transactions or defaulting on transactions, the receiver acts to maximize the return to all creditors of the failed bank, without regard for the counterparties to foreign exchange transactions as a particular group of creditors.
A final issue concerns the status of claimns against a bankrupt bank that result from its default on foreign exchange transactions. Solvent counterparties are assumed to have the status of general creditor's. In our example, losses are calculated under the assumption that general creditors receive nothing. All proceeds from the liquidation of assets go to creditors with more senior claims. 'These legal assumptions yield the maximumn losses to counterparties. Thus, the losses calculated in particular cases can be viewed as the maximum, not necessarily the most likely, losses. pa~are Suppose Banks A and B agree to settle theim' tm-ansactions as illustrated in the top half of figure 1, the gross settlement method. Suppose also that Bank A goes hankmupt before the four payments are executed on the value date. The possible loss to Bank B depends on the timing of the bankruptcy of Bank A.
In one situation, called jjre-settlement failure, Bank A goes bankrupt before the value date, and Bank B knows about this event by the opening of business on the value date. In the other situation, called settlement failure, a bank makes payment on the value date for its side of foreign exchange transactions but does not receive payment from a counterparty.
One feature of the foreign exchange market that makes banks vulnerable to settlement failure is the difference in the time zones of central banks. The failure of the Herstatt Bank in 1974 illustrates the relationship between time zones and settlement failure. On June 26, 1974, German banking authorities closed Herstatt as of the close of business in Germany. Herstatt had received payment in marks during German banking hours for its foreign exchange transactions with that value date. It was closed, however, before the time for making payments in dollars in New York. Counterparties of Herstatt were left without the dollars they expected, after paying marks to Flerstatt earlier in the day.' 2 Our example of settlement failure in this paper reflects the implications of differences in time zones. One bank is assumed to go bankrupt after the time for payments in pounds but before the time for making payments in dollars.
Pre-Settlement Failure -Suppose Bank A goes bankrupt before the value date. Without a netting agreement between Banks A and B, the legal obligations of each hank are those specified in the individual transactions between them. With an exchange rate of $1.65 on the value date, transaction number I is profitable to Bank A. The receiver of Bank A will pay £ 100 to Bank B to settle transaction number 1. Bank B is obligated to pay $175 to Bank A to settle this transaction. Since transaction number 2 is not profitable to Bank A on the value date, the receiver will default on transaction number 2. Bank B anticipated a profit of $2.50 on the value date from transaction numnber 2. Thus, the bankruptcy of Bank A imposes a loss of $2.50 on Bank B. ' Table 5 shows the loss to each bank due to the bankruptcy of its counterparty before the value date, under both gross settlement and netting arrangements. Settlement Failure -Suppose Bank A goes bankrupt on the value date after payment in pounds but before payment in dollars. Bank A defaults on its payment of $85 to Bank B on the value date. Under gross settlement of transactions, however, Bank B is obligated to pay the $175 to Bank A. Bank B becomes a general creditor of Bank A for $85. The maximum loss to Bank B, as table 6 indicates, is $85.
Settlement failure can create liquidity problems for the counterparties of a failed bank. Suppose Bank B pays the $175 to Bank A before discovering that Bank A is bankrupt. 'T'he cash balances of Bank B denominated in dollars will he $85 below the level it had projected for the value date. Bank B might request a discount window loan from the Federal Reserve to cover the $85 shortfall in its m'eserve account.
sa.Cfef!tLs
If Banks A and B engage in bilateral netting, the effects of the bankruptcy of Bank A on Bank B depend on whether paying the net amount discharges the obligations between counterparties.
ta-eel ;%eetitfletiufls
Under one type of agreement called position netting, two banks agree to net their payments to reduce transactions costs, hut the agreement has no effect on their legal obligations. Under' the legal assumptions in this paper, the position netting agreement would not prevent the receiver from making payments in settlement of some transactions hut defaulting on other's with the same counterparty. The bankruptcy court would treat the payment obligation of Banks A and B as though they had no netting agreement. The bankruptcy of one party has the same implica-' 2 Moore (1974) . Netting agreements that reduce this exposure to loss mandate that banks discharge their obligations by paying the net amount of the transactions between them. The legal language for such agreements is netting by novation. This paper assumes that bankruptcy courts recognize a contract for netting by novation as the only contract between counterparties for settlement of foreign exchange transactions.
A provision of bilateral netting contracts that reduces risk is called closeout, which becomes effective when a receiver or liquidator is appointed after a bank declares bankruptcy." A netting agreement includes a formula that converts all outstanding transactions between a pair of counterparties, for all value dates, into one amount payable immediately. The closeout provision prohibits the receiver of a bankrupt bank from making payments in settlement for transactions with some value dates but defaulting on transactions with other value dates." Bankruptcy courts are assumed to recognize closeout provisions as valid parts of netting arrangements. smaller under bilateral netting by nox'ation than under' gross settlement for each combination of failed hank amid counterparty.
'The assumptions in this paper concerning the principles that bankruptcy courts follow yield the maximum reductions in losses from netting. These reductions in losses could he smaller under alternative assumptions.
'The Lamfalussv Report indicates that hilatem-al netting could increase risk in settling foreign exchange transactions if netting arrangements do not have a sound legal basis. If netting obscures the level of exposures, then netting arrangemerits have the lJotential to contribute to an increase in sstemic risk.'''' The argument that bilateral netting may pose greater risks is based on assumptions about how banks that are active in the foreign exchange market set credit limits with counterparties. Banks with bilateral netting agreements max' set credit lirni ts with each other based on their net positions rather than the gross value of the underlying transactions hetween them. If a bankruptcy court requires payments by a solvent countem-pam'tv based on the value of the underlying transactions rather than the netting agreement, the exposure of the solvent counterpartv would he larger than cxpected. This point indicates why the Lamfalussv Report emphasizes the legal basis for netting ari-angements (table 1).
Banks may be able to further reduce their transaction costs and their exposure to loss by engaging in multilateral nettimig. No multilateral netting arrangements are in operation at this time. This section examines the implications of a multilateral netting arr'angement modeled after a draft of the plans of the ECHO NETTING system in London."
I .a~,rmi~Iona -In the contract for multilateral netting, members of a netting at'-rangement establish a clearing house, which receives and pays out currencies in settlement of foreign exchange transactions. The clearing house is the counterparty for each tm'ansaction between members of the multilateral netting arrangement. Each member settles its legal obligations with the other's by making payments to the clearing house. 'The clearing house assumes responsibility for paving all net amounts due to members, even if a member defaults on its payments to the clearing house.
'l'he contract in a inulti lateral netting arrangement is assumed to include a closeout provision. If a member of the clearing house goes bankrupt, its receiver has only one decision to make about the foreign exchange transactions that the failed bank negotiated with other' members: make the pa~mnentsto settle the one contract with the clearing house or default. Any clearing house losses resulting from the default of a member are allocated to the other members in proportion to the losses they would have incurred under bilateral netting. This formnula gives each member of the arrangement an incentive to avoid transactions with members it considers to he in danger of going bankrupt.
If Bank A goes bankrupt before the value date, its receiver will default on the payment of $2.50 to the clearing house. The loss of $2.50 is allocated to Bank C, since only Bank C would have a loss under bilateral netting.
If Bank B goes bankrupt before the value date, its receiver will make the payment of £ 50 to settle the contract with the clearing house, since it yields a profit of $5 to Bank B. As table S indicates, the bankruptcy of Bank B before the value date imposes no loss on the other banks. The bankruptcy of Bank C imposes a loss of $2.50 on Bank B. In each case in table 5, the "Bank for International Settlements (1990c), p. 3. "Duncan (1991) .
